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LOOK BEFORE You LEAP AND KEEP ON
LOOKING: LESSONS FROM THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION
Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh*
INTRODUCTION
In this symposium issue, Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow proposes that
new processes encouraging "deliberative democracy" ought to be institutional-
ized, to supplement or even supplant the processes that currently characterize
public decision making. Professor Menkel-Meadow expresses disillusionment
with this country's traditional decision making processes for many reasons:
they encourage bi-polar thinking; they do not elicit multiple voices; they dis-
courage creativity; and, ultimately, they may be "ill-suited to resolving, manag-
ing or at least, handling, modem day legal and social problems" that "require
input from a multiplicity of constituencies and coordinated action by a multi-
plicity of legal and political institutions."' Simultaneously, Professor Menkel-
Meadow places substantial faith in the potential of both alternative, more flexi-
ble processes and members of the legal profession. But can we be sure that a
largely-untested new will be better than the admittedly-flawed old? What hap-
pens as innovations are absorbed into pre-existing institutions? And are law-
yers really best-suited to be the architects of these new processes and their
institutionalization?
These are weighty questions with only uncertain answers. History, how-
ever, can sometimes provide helpful guidance. More than twenty-five years
ago, a group of lawyers and judges gathered in St. Paul, Minnesota, to confront
problems in the operation of the nation's overwhelmed courts. Much like Pro-
fessor Menkel-Meadow today, they were searching for innovations that could
help the courts better address citizens' needs. When Professor Frank Sander
introduced the concept of the multi-door courthouse at the Pound Conference,
the great experiment with the institutionalization of court-connected ADR -
particularly mediation - began.
* Bobbi McAdoo is Professor of Law and Senior Fellow of the Dispute Resolution Institute,
Hamline University School of Law. Nancy A. Welsh is Professor of Law and Associate
Director of the Center for Dispute Resolution, The Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University. The authors extend special thanks to Elise Kahl, Megan
Kraby, Jen Modjeska and Lauren Avallone for their research assistance.
1 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L. J.
347, 348 (2005).
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This article will use the institutionalization of general civil mediation' into
the courts as a case study, with both hopeful and cautionary lessons for policy
makers who are drawn to Professor Menkel-Meadow's proposal. There can be
little doubt that court-connected mediation has been successful in achieving
widespread institutionalization in the nation's courts. But widespread institu-
tionalization alone does not constitute success.3 Instead, pronouncements of
success should be grounded in the achievement of goals that enable institutions
to better fulfill their missions. Therefore, policy makers considering the adop-
tion of alternative processes like those proposed by Professor Menkel-Meadow
must first answer the following questions: (1) what are the core missions of the
institutions that will use these processes? (2) what improvements are to be
achieved through the institutionalization of new, alternative processes? (3) at
what points could the institutionalization of new, alternative processes actually
threaten an institution's ability to fulfill its core mission? (4) how can the
potential improvements and threats be measured? (5) what monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms will be put in place to take these measurements? and
(6) who will be responsible for taking responsive action and how can such
action be ensured?
This article begins by examining the goals for court-connected ADR that
were discussed at the Pound Conference and that have guided courts' adoption
of mediation programs. Importantly, all of these goals are grounded in the
courts' institutional mission, to deliver justice - substantive justice, procedural
justice, and efficient justice in appropriate forums.4 In Section II, the article
turns to the perspectives of judges, lawyers and parties to assess whether and to
what extent court-connected mediation has achieved these goals. This section
pays particular attention to the recently-gathered perceptions of state trial court
judges in Minnesota, the very state where the Pound Conference initiated the
experiment with court-connected ADR. As the stakeholders who are charged
with translating the courts' lofty mission into reality, judges' perspectives are
particularly important. Based on the successes and limitations revealed by the
perspectives of judges, lawyers, and parties, Section III proposes reforms of
court-connected mediation to better ensure the achievement of justice. Finally,
2 This excludes family and small claims mediation, which have also been institutionalized in
the courts.
3 Early advocates of mediation, including the authors, sometimes pointed to the extent of
ADR use (its institutionalization) as evidence of the success of ADR. We recognize the fact
that institutionalization can encourage the achievement of ADR's goals and vice versa; how-
ever, without knowing more specifically what is institutionalized, the extent of use of ADR
per se does not signal "success."
I Others have also grappled with defining the goals and objectives for a civil justice system.
See, e.g., Jean Stemlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a Sys-
tem of Justice, 3 NEv. L. J. 289, 299 (2003) (speculating that disputants seek: a civil justice
system the provides "a substantively fair/just result;" a system "that meets the procedural
justice criteria[;]" and "a system that helps them to achieve other personal and emotional
goals ... or that at least does not leave them feeling worse"); Adrian Zuckerman, Justice in
Crisis: Comparative Dimensions of Civil Procedure, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 3, 10
(Adrian Zuckerman, ed. 1999) (suggesting that systems of justice should be evaluated along
three dimensions: whether the system produces correct judgments; whether the system pro-
vides timely judgments; and whether the system is so costly that it affects access to justice
and/or provides wealthy litigants with a procedural advantage).
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in Section IV, the article suggests how the experience with court-connected
mediation should inform the development and implementation of processes to
institutionalize Professor Menkel-Meadow's "deliberative democracy."
I. DEFINING THE GOALS OF ADR5
In order to assess court-connected mediation's success in achieving its
goals, it is essential to begin with definitions of those goals.6 Therefore, this
article offers a brief look at ADR's roots, specifically insights from the Pound
Conference that gave rise to court-connected ADR.7
Dean Roscoe Pound gave a key speech in St. Paul, Minnesota in 1906
entitled "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice." Cataloguing the causes of dissatisfaction at that time, Pound suggested a
wide-ranging course of reforms, hoping the country would be able to ".... look
forward to a near future when our courts will be swift and certain agents of
justice, whose decisions will be acquiesced in and respected by all."8 His sug-
gestions, however, were met with marked coolness by the elite American Bar
Association. In 1975, Chief Justice Warren Burger began a new push for "a
conference of representative leaders to consider the problems of justice and the
need to anticipate problems as yet unidentified that the nation would face in the
remainder of this century." 9 The resulting conference, jointly sponsored by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, the Conference of Chief Judges, and
the American Bar Association, had as its focus the "unfinished business" of
Pound's 1906 speech. It was symbolically held in St. Paul in 1976, almost
exactly seventy years after the original Pound Conference.1°
Justice Burger articulated the questions addressed at the conference as:
(1) what types of disputes can best be resolved by judicial action and what
alternatives are superior? and (2) how can we serve the interests of justice with
processes that are more speedy and less expensive? 1 These questions were
grounded in the perception that the court system as a whole was being danger-
ously overwhelmed by the tremendous increases in litigation that occurred dur-
5 We first articulated the idea of using the Pound Conference to develop these goals at the
2004 annual conference of the ABA Section on Dispute Resolution. We thank those who
gave us feedback at that time, particularly Donna Stienstra, Jean Sternlight and Gary Weiner.
6 Ideally, this exercise is similar to that of setting goals and then evaluating their achieve-
ment for any individual ADR program. See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Court-Con-
nected General Civil ADR Programs: Aiming for Institutionalization, Efficient Resolution
and the Experience of Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES (Donna Stienstra & Susan
Yates eds., 2004) (without clear goals, effective monitoring and evaluation is unlikely to
occur).
7 THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FuTRE: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (A. Leo Levin and Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) [hereinafter
"POUND PROCEEDINGS"]. Excerpts from the Pound Conference are also found in Varieties of
Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976).
8 POUND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, at 353.
9 Id. at 5.
10 Id. at 5-6. This 1976 conference is often referred to as the beginning of modem day
ADR.
II Id. at 6.
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ing the 20th century. To prepare for the challenges of the 21st century, the
judges, lawyers and academics assembled in St. Paul were to offer bold ideas
for change.
12
In a foreword to the published proceedings, three former ABA presidents
argued for serious consideration of the agenda developed at the Pound Confer-
ence. They asserted that there had been an excessive resort to litigation
because the nation's citizens had so much respect for the courts. Specifically,
these lawyers wrote that people:
feel and see that they are getting a measure of justice in the courts, the kind of
respectful attention and thoughtful consideration that they do not think they get any-
where else .... The real and present danger in our day is that the never-ending
demands on the American judicial system may, if there is no relief, so overwhelm the
capacity of the courts, that people will become disenchanted with the courts too.
13
These bar leaders further maintained that the 2000 A.D. deadline Justice
Burger established at the conference allowed for the reconstruction needed "if
our legal institutions, and particularly our courts, are to function as well as they
must in order to maintain the rule of law as the principle of order in our con-
flict-ridden and ever-changing society."1 4
Chief Justice Burger delivered the keynote address at the conference and
made clear his view that "[tihere is nothing incompatible between efficiency
and justice. Inefficient courts cause delay and expense, and diminish the value
of the judgment.. .. Efficiency - like the trial itself - is not an end in itself. It
has as its objective the very purpose of the whole system - to do justice.
Justice Burger referred to Justice Pound's view that ". . . the function of the
courts [is] to deliver social and economic justice according to standards estab-
lished by law. '"16
The Pound Conference address given by Harvard Professor Frank E. A.
Sander is now a part of the historical lore of the ADR movement. Among other
ideas offered to address the problems of court overload, Professor Sander intro-
duced the multi-door courthouse.1 7 He encouraged the exploration of alterna-
tive ways of resolving disputes outside the courthouse, suggesting that there is
a "rich variety of different processes, which, I would submit, singly or in com-
bination, may provide far more 'effective' conflict resolution."' 8 He also sug-
gested that rational criteria could be developed "for allocating various types of
disputes to different dispute resolution processes."' 9
12 Burger suggested a need to "open our minds to consideration of means and forums that
have not been tried before." Id. at 32.
13 Id. at 11.
14 Id. at 14.
15 Id. at 29. Burger made clear that his objective was not to reduce access to justice. He
recognized, however, the need to ensure an orderly evolution of the judicial system. To that
end, he said, "[t]here is nothing dangerous about studying and considering basic change, if
the alterations will preserve old values and 'deliver' justice at the lowest possible cost in the
shortest feasible time." Id.
16 Id. at 27.
17 Id. at 84.
18 Id. at 67. Sander suggested possible effectiveness criteria to be "cost, speed, accuracy,
credibility (to the public and the parties), and workability. In some cases, but not in all,
predictability may also be important." Id. at 67 n.7.
19 Id. at 67.
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Professor Sander educated those at the conference about the range of
available alternatives and quoted Lon Fuller regarding the "central quality of
mediation," namely "its capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not
by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared
perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes
and dispositions toward one another."'20 He contrasted this potential with limit-
ing aspects of a judicial process - "the use of a third party with coercive power,
the usually 'win or lose' nature of the decision, and the tendency of the deci-
sion to focus narrowly on the immediate matter at issue as distinguished from a
concern with the underlying relationship between the parties. 2 1 Professor
Sander stated that especially when disputes arose between individuals in a
long-term relationship, a mediated solution worked out by the parties was
"likely to be far more acceptable (and hence durable)."'22 Professor Sander also
made clear that he was not "maintaining that cases asserting novel constitu-
tional claims ought to be diverted to mediation or arbitration." On the contrary,
the "goal is to reserve the courts for those activities for which they are best
suited and to avoid swamping and paralyzing them with cases that do not
require their unique capabilities." 23
A. Leon Higginbotham, then a federal district court judge, served as a sort
of moral compass for the conference, to ensure that the deliberations would not
lose sight of the need for basic fairness both in judicial process and outcome.
He expanded upon Professor Sander's caution:
I hope that the fruits of [the conference's] success will flow not just to judges, not
just to lawyers, not just to court personnel, but also to those who, in the nature of
things, will seldom be attending a conference like this - the weak, the poor, the
powerless - those who, whether they like it or not, are inevitably involved in the
process and the system that we are privileged to preside over. By all means let us
reform that process, let us make it more swift, more efficient, and less expensive, but
above all let us make it more just .... Let us not, in our zeal to reform our process,
make the powerless into victims who can secure relief neither in the courts nor any-
where else.
2 4
Finally, one of the commentators for the conference, Judge Wade McCree
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sounded a major
conference theme: "The courts must not improve efficiency in ways that
endanger justice, that endanger the appearance of justice, that endanger princi-
pled decision making, or the evolution of doctrines that are responsive to the
needs of society.'"25
At the conclusion of the conference, the Pound Conference Follow-Up
Task Force chaired by the Honorable Griffin Bell provided oversight to ensure
that conference proposals would be developed and implemented where appro-
priate. Soon after the conference, Bell became the Attorney General of the
United States, and this proved to be fortuitous for the ultimate success of some
20 Id. at 69.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 74.
23 Id. at 85.
24 Id. at 110.
25 Id. at 24.
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of the conference proposals. 26 The Task Force issued several reports and cata-
logued the progress being made. The importance of "justice" as critical to the
reforms proposed by the Pound Conference was again emphasized:
It is important to keep firmly in mind that neither efficiency for the sake of effi-
ciency, nor speed of adjudication for its own sake are the ends which underlie our
concern with the administration of justice in this country. The ultimate goal is to
make it possible for our system to provide justice for all. Constitutional guarantees
of human rights ring hollow if there is no forum available in fact for their vindication.
Statutory rights become empty promises if adjudication is too long delayed to make
them meaningful or the value of a claim is consumed by the expense of asserting it.
Only if our courts are functioning smoothly can equal justice become a reality for all.
The ultimate goal, it is worth reiterating, is the fullest measure of justice for all. 27
Much has happened since the Pound Conference. Federal and state courts
located throughout the nation have embraced ADR, particularly mediation.
Individual courts and entire state court systems have identified their own rea-
sons for making mediation part of the civil litigation process,28 as well as their
expectations of court-connected mediators.29 Often, the courts' goals and
expectations sound quite consistent with those identified during the Pound Con-
ference. In some instances, though, courts or individual judges have suggested
additional aspirations. Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil, for example, has
emphasized the importance of providing litigants with the ability to choose the
process that best meets their needs.3" In addition, many courts' ethical codes
for mediators highlight the importance of protecting parties' self-determination,
including the ability to choose the outcome that best meets their needs.31
How, then, can this article assess whether court-connected mediation has
been successful? Based on the Pound Conference and the subsequent experi-
ence with court-connected mediation, we will anchor our analysis in the
achievement of three goals, with each divided into several measurable objec-
tives. For court-connected mediation to be considered successful, it must help
courts deliver:
(1) Substantive justice, including:
Outcomes that are consistent with the rule of law;
Outcomes that are responsive to litigants' needs;
Outcomes that are consistent with parties' self-determination;
26 Attorney General Bell was instrumental in ensuring funds for the implementation of three
Neighborhood Justice Centers to experiment with a variety of methods of processing dis-
putes, i.e., to provide practical models of Frank Sander's multi-door courthouse concept.
JAMES ALFINI, ET AL., MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACrIC 11 (2001).
27 POUND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, at 300.
28 See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 6, at 2 (describing goals of various courts).
29 Id. at 30-33 (describing ethical codes applying to court-connected neutrals generally and
to mediators in particular).
30 Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better Way?, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 93 (2002) (urging that providing parties with the ability to
choose is part of ensuring process fairness).
31 See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEG. L. REV. 1, 1-2
(2001) (provisions regarding self-determination in the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, as well as the ethical codes adopted in Minnesota, Florida, Massachusetts and
Virginia for court-connected mediators).
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Outcomes that are durable;
Outcomes that maintain or improve relationships;
Outcomes that parties will perceive as fair;
(2) Procedural justice, including:
32
A process that is perceived as fair by the parties;
An opportunity for parties to express their views ("voice");
An opportunity for parties' views to be heard and considered by someone
involved in decision-making;
Treatment that will be perceived by parties as even-handed;
Treatment that will be perceived by parties as dignified and respectful;
and
(3) Efficient justice in an appropriate forum, including:
Savings in time and costs for parties;
Savings in time and costs for courts;
Shorter time periods between filing and disposition;
A reduction in the number of court trials;
Matching of the forum to the needs of the case and the litigants;
An opportunity for parties to access the process they believe will be most appro-
priate for the resolution of their case.
With these goals and objectives as our benchmarks, this article will now
examine empirical data revealing the perspectives of judges, attorneys and par-
ties about ADR, particularly mediation, in order to glean what this data says
about the achievement of the key goals and objectives identified above.
H. EMPIRICAL DATA REGARDING COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION'S SUCCESS
IN ACHIEVING ITS GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
A. The Judicial Perspective
Many judges have written thoughtfully about their own experiences as
lawyers, ADR neutrals and judges, drawing conclusions about effective ADR
and its use for the administration of "justice" in our court systems.
3 3 The Fed-
eral Judicial Center (FJC), the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and
other organizations have also published excellent books and manuals directly
related to best practices for court-annexed ADR.34 These resources certainly
32 Beginning in the 1970s, social psychologists conducted extensive research clarifying the
process characteristics that communicate procedural justice. Those process characteristics
are reflected in the objectives listed here. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-
Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 820-26
(2001); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUS-
TICE (1988); E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authori-
ties, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
33 See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 30, at 93; William Lynch, Problems with Court-Annexed
Mandatory Arbitration: Illustrations From the New Mexico Experience, 32 N.M. L. REV.,
181 (2002); William W. Schwarzer, ADR & the Federal Courts: Questions & Decisions for
the Future, FJC DIRECTIONS, No. 7, 2 (1994); D. Brock Homby, Federal Court-Annexed
ADR: After the Hoopla, FJC DIRECTIONS, No. 7, 26 (1994).
34 See e.g., ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR
(Federal Judicial Center 2001); NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION
PROGRAMS (Center for Dispute Settlement/The Institute for Judicial Admin.1998),
www.cadrs.org/downloads/NationalStandards.pdf; MONITORING & EVALUATING COURT-
BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS
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provide insights into judicial perspectives on ADR. They do not, however,
offer an empirical basis for assessing court-connected mediation's success in
achieving its goals and objectives.
Some limited empirical data regarding judicial perspectives on court-con-
nected mediation exist. It is important to note, however, that some of this
research details only judicial expectations about what ADR might contribute to
a court system; other research is based on fairly limited judicial experience with
new ADR programs. In Indiana, for example, a benchmark study for a new
ADR rule examined the attitudes of Indiana trial-court judges regarding the
anticipated strengths and weaknesses of mediation. The study found strong
support for the perception that mediation is not redundant (i.e., does not dupli-
cate what attorneys normally do); that mediation tends to save time and not add
significantly to the costs of civil case processing; that agreements reached in
mediation are more likely to be maintained; and that mediation encourages par-
ties to take more responsibility for dealing with their conflicts.35
Research in California was designed to determine how "the courts and the
ADR community might be brought into a closer working relationship to reduce
court filings and to promote fair and efficient settlement of filed cases."36 The
judges' reported expectations were encouraging for mediation advocates:
Judges familiar with ADR had high praise for such processes, especially mediation.
In interviews and... questionnaires they described mediation as an effective way to
educate parties about the relative costs and benefits of settlement compared to litiga-
tion and about the realistic possibilities of settlement; to give the parties a more
accurate evaluation of their case's worth; to help the parties resolve relationship
problems that might otherwise interfere with settlement; and to allow the parties to
tailor settlements that best meet their individual or corporate needs. As a result, they
had no doubts that ADR could significantly help to bring about more, quicker, and
fairer settlements, thereby easing the burden on the courts and increasing citizen
access to justice.
3 7
The Federal Judicial Center, meanwhile, studied several federal district
court programs established under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and
published a detailed report that included a great deal of data about judicial
perceptions of the success of various ADR programs.38 Key conclusions about
the ADR programs in the Northern District of California and the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri included the following:
(National Center for State Courts 1997); MELINDA OSTERMEYER AND SUSAN KEILITZ, Moni-
toring and Evaluating Court-Based Dispute Resolution Programs: A Guide for Judges and
Court Managers (National Center for State Courts 1997); ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA
STIENSTRA, ADR & SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR
JUDGES & LAWYERS (Federal Judicial Center & CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution 1996).
Other resources can be found in McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 6, at 1 n. 1.
11 Morris Medley & James Schellenberg, Attitudes of Indiana Judges Toward Mediation, 12
MEDIATION Q., 185, 190 (1994).
36 Jay Folberg et al., Use of ADR in California Courts: Findings and Proposals, 26 U.S.F.
L. REv. 343, 347 (1992).
17 Id. at 365. These were of course all judicial expectations for mediation.
38 DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT
ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PRO-
GRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (Federal Judicial
Center 1997).
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In California, judges felt that their Multi-Option Program succeeded in giving
choices to parties for case resolution so that attorneys did get together and talk about
the best way to resolve the case; the need for litigation was decreased; and the ADR
program led to and encouraged early resolution.
39
In Missouri, the Early Assessment Program (EAP), akin to an early evaluative media-
tion session conducted by a staff mediator, was cited for its ability to provide ear-
lier case resolution. The judges felt that the program reduced their workloads and
saved court time; that there was substantial litigant satisfaction, even though the pro-
gram had initially met with strong resistance from the Bar; and that client attendance
had helped achieve the settlements.
4 1
Importantly, however, the data collected in the Federal Judicial Center's
research project reflected only three to five years of operating program
experience.
It is therefore important to see the effects of well-established and widely-
used - i.e., institutionalized - court-connected mediation programs on courts'
ability to achieve their missions. The Minnesota state court system's mediation
program offered just such an opportunity, and in January 2003, one of the
authors of this article conducted a survey of trial judges there. In order to put
these judges' perceptions of ADR and court-connected mediation in context, it
is useful to describe both the Minnesota state court experience with mediation
and the background of the survey.
In Minnesota, a "mandatory consideration" ADR rule has been in place
since 1994 and a considerable amount of ADR, especially mediation, has
occurred as a result.4 2 After almost a decade of judicial experience with ADR,
especially mediation, the Minnesota ADR Review Board, charged with over-
sight of ADR implementation, surveyed all 287 Minnesota state district court
judges to determine how the rule was being implemented throughout the state
and whether any changes to the rule were needed.4 3 With ample opportunity
on the survey instrument for individualized comments, an analysis of survey
responses provides a unique empirical picture of current judicial thinking about
the achievements and limitations of a widely-used court-connected mediation
program.
The structure of the mandatory consideration rule in Minnesota is as fol-
lows: attorneys are required to consider the use of ADR in every civil case,
39 Id. at 193.
40 See id. at 228 for a description of the program.
41 Id. at 217.
42 MINN. GEN. R. PRAc. 114. Although Minnesota does not keep statistics on the use of
ADR, Minnesota's experience in institutionalizing ADR is detailed in Bobbi McAdoo, The
Minnesota Experience: Exploration to Institutionalization, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y
65 (1991). In addition, an earlier evaluation of the rule from the attorney perspective is in
Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule 114 on Civil
Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REv. 403 (2002) [hereinafter "McAdoo,
Lawyer Report"].
43 The survey instrument was developed by Bobbi McAdoo and included a section of ques-
tions specifically about referrals to mediation, the clear process of choice in Minnesota. The
Minnesota Supreme Court Administrator's office mailed the survey and collected the
responses. The response rate was 71% (203 judges). The subsequent analysis and report to
the ADR Review Board was prepared by Bobbi McAdoo. See BOBBI McADoo, THE JUDI-
CIAL PERSPECTIVE ON RULE 114 IN MINNESOTA (2004).
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discuss ADR with their client(s) and opposing counsel and advise the court
regarding their conclusions about ADR. This includes the selection of both a
process and neutral, along with the timing of an ADR process. Although the
parties (or more accurately, the parties' attorneys) have complete discretion in
their choices to this point, if they decide not to use ADR and report this to the
court, judges can nonetheless order the parties into non-binding ADR.44 What
happened in practice in Minnesota, after the new rule was in place, was that
judges often ordered ADR, sometimes even when the parties and counsel had
advised the court that ADR was not appropriate. In fact, within only two years
of the effective date of the mandatory consideration rule, and especially in the
Twin Cities urban area, judges' routine ordering of ADR was a key factor moti-
vating attorneys to select mediation.45 Once attorneys began to select and par-
ticipate in mediation routinely, its use became "institutionalized." Thus, the
Minnesota courts' ADR program is mostly lawyer-driven and virtually runs
itself, theoretically needing no additional court resources to manage, monitor or
evaluate its operation or results.
If "institutionalization" is defined in terms of the availability and routine
use of alternatives to trial, then the structural design of Minnesota' s "mandatory
consideration" rule has resulted in the clear institutionalization of ADR, espe-
cially court-connected mediation.46 But it is important to restate here that the
authors of this article do not believe that institutionalization, without more, sig-
nals success. Institutionalization, without more, does not ensure that any of
court-connected mediation's justice goals have been achieved.47
We turn now to the data regarding the judicial perspective, and specifi-
cally to an analysis of the successes and limitations of court-connected media-
tion that are suggested by this data. It is a daunting task, but thinking in terms
of court-connected mediation's goals and objectives should help to frame and
improve the productivity of future dialogue regarding courts' integration of
ADR and the institutionalization of alternative processes in other important
contexts.
44 MINN. GEN. R. PRAc. 114.
15 McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 472. Some attorneys noted a decision to
"choose mediation voluntarily" to ensure they did not get ordered to non-binding arbitration.
Id. at 429.
46 In fact, almost 80% of judges perceive that when ADR is used in a case, mediation is the
process used more than 75% of the time. McADOO, supra note 43, at 22. Thus it is fair to
assume in the analysis of the data that answers given about the use of ADR are usually
answers about the use of mediation.
47 For example, many judges perceive "local court policy to send cases to ADR/mediation"
as a reason to order cases to mediation. McADoo, supra note 43, at 17. A clear court policy
lends needed legitimacy to court programs expanding the use of ADR, but it says nothing
about whether "justice" is actually done in ADR. Mandatory programs have contributed to
the institutionalization of ADR; for that reason we have supported this approach in the past.
McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 6, at 10. We are now re-thinking our stance on this issue.
See infra sections II.A.4 and III.A.
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1. Court-Connected Mediation's Success in Achieving the Goal of
Substantive Justice
In determining whether court-connected mediation has achieved its goal of
substantive justice, it is essential to focus on the quality of dispute resolution
outcomes. The outcome-related factors used by judges when deciding whether
to order a case to mediation 4 8 are encouraging. Judges perceived the following
substantive factors as "very important": "mediation can provide better,4 9 more
durable outcome for parties;" 5 ° and "the case needs a neutral with specific
expertise."" These responses are consistent with judicial opinions on the most
important mediator qualifications: "creative problem solver;" 52 "legal experi-
ence;" and "substantive knowledge in area of case being litigated.
53
In the courtroom, "just" outcomes are determined by applying the law to
the specific facts of the case. Thus, it is not surprising that judges choosing
mediation to settle cases prefer to have a "problem-solving" lawyer with
knowledge of the relevant law presiding over the process. Indeed, these survey
answers support a largely evaluative view of mediation,54 similar to the judicial
settlement conference model with which judges are familiar, 5 albeit with a
48 The question was: "[i]f you order a case to mediation, when the attorneys or pro se parties
have not made the choice themselves, how important are each of the following factors in
warranting your order?" Each possible factor could be rated "not at all important, 'some-
what important," or "very important." A follow-up question allowed for additional judicial
input. McADOO, supra note 43, at app. A, 5.
49 Although "better" was not defined explicitly, judicial responses throughout the survey
suggest some expected quality beyond simple efficiency, although that is always included
and critical. One judge wrote: "[w]hen parties reach their own settlement, they are more
,vested' in the outcome." (Q 19, Judge # 188). Another wrote: "[s]ettled matters, generally,
provide [a] greater sense of satisfaction to litigants." (Q 16, Judge # 9).
10 From the list of factors, the highest number of judge respondents (56%) made this choice.
McADoo, supra note 43, at 17.
51 The third highest number of judge respondents (42%) made this choice. Id.
52 The question was: "[w]hen you choose the mediator, what qualifications are important to
you?" There were 11 choices plus an "other" category, each of which the judges rated "very
important," somewhat important," or "not at all important." Id. at app. A, 7. The highest
number of judge respondents (79%) rated "creative problem solver" as "very important." Id.
at 23.
53 These choices were both selected by 70% of the judges. Id.
54 Court-connected mediation is not a process with "transformation" as its goal. Judges
want settlements, and "transformative mediation" does not have the production of settle-
ments as one of its goals. Rather, the "value-added" of transformative mediation involves
bringing party empowerment and recognition to the negotiation process, i.e., the enhance-
ment of the quality of each party's own decision-making and the improvement of inter-party
communication and understanding. Robert A. Baruch Bush, What Do We Need a Mediator
For? Mediation's "Value-Added" For Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 36
(1996).
15 See Welsh, supra note 31, at 25-26. See also Jonathan Hyman & Milton Heumann,
Minitrials and Matchmakers: Styles of Conducting Settlement Conferences, 80 JUDICATURE
123 (1996) (In observations of judicial settlement conferences, the authors observed two
distinct styles, depending on whether the substantive issues of the disputes (the legally rele-
vant facts), or the process of settlement negotiations (drawing out common settlement num-
bers in caucus), were stressed. These models were not found to be mutually exclusive; each
requires an evaluative mindset and a push for settlement.).
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neutral lawyer in charge.56 Presumably this model, with its emphasis on neu-
tral legal expertise, helps to ensure a measure of substantive justice for the
litigants before the court.
These perceptions of the value of mediation suggest that judges perceive
mediation as achieving the following substantive justice objectives identified
supra:
Mediated outcomes consistent with the rule of law; 57 and
Mediated outcomes that are durable.
2. Court-Connected Mediation's Success in Achieving the Goal of
Procedural Justice
Another "very important" factor cited by judges as a basis for ordering
mediation is that "[tihe use of mediation gets the clients directly involved in
discussions."' 8 It is likely that the judges view clients' involvement as impor-
tant simply because it makes settlement more likely.59 In addition, however, if
parties are directly involved in the discussion of their lawsuits, they will have
an opportunity to express themselves and gauge the extent to which they have
been heard and understood by the other side and the mediator. These process
characteristics make it more likely that the parties will perceive the mediation
process as procedurally just. But judges can only assume the parties' direct and
active participation, and there is significant research indicating that parties'
voices are heard much less frequently than those of their attorneys. 60 Nonethe-
less, the judges' appreciation of client involvement suggests that, at least as
compared to attorneys' bilateral settlement negotiations, the following procedu-
ral justice objectives are being achieved to some extent: .
Parties have the opportunity to express their views ("voice"); and
Parties have the opportunity to have their views heard and considered by someone
involved in decision-making.
3. Court-Connected Mediation's Success in Achieving the Goal of
Efficient Justice in an Appropriate Forum
The survey of Minnesota judges clearly illustrates that judges think the
goal of efficient justice is being addressed by ADR, including mediation. Per-
haps this result is not surprising in view of the settlement culture to which
judges are now accustomed. 6 ' In answer to a question about whether the ADR
56 Although the neutral lawyer is assumed to have more license to be a "creative" problem
solver, it is doubtful that this has translated into much dispute resolution outside of legal
norms. Craig McEwen distinguished predictive from problem-solving mediation in, Pursu-
ing Problem-Solving or Predictive Settlement, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV., 77, 78-79 (1991). See
also infra sections II.A.4 and I.B.I.
17 Particularly because one of the litigants has chosen to bring his/her dispute to the courts
for resolution, it is possible - but not certain - that "outcomes consistent with the rule of
law" will also often be "outcomes responsive to litigant needs." See infra notes 80 and 131.
58 This choice was selected by 50% of the judges. McADoo, supra note 43, at 17.
59 See STIENSTRA, supra note 38 (indicating that Missouri judges similarly valued the Early
Assessment Program because client attendance helped produce settlements).
" Welsh, supra note 31, at 4-5.
61 The relationship between the settlement culture and ADR is beyond the scope of this
article. Nevertheless, the settlement culture exists and presumably supports efficiency goals
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rule had changed their judicial workload, two thirds of the judges answered in
the affirmative. Almost all of these judges' written responses (95%) involved
some version of ADR getting cases settled, reducing the number of trials, or
contributing to earlier settlements or earlier trial dates for those cases that do
not settle. A few examples of what the judges wrote include the following:
"[ADR] has decreased the number of civil and family cases actually going to trial."
(Judge #3)
"Some complex cases have been settled either directly or indirectly as a result of
mediation." (Judge #112)
"Most cases settle prior to holding, or even scheduling, a settlement conference with
the court, reducing the time needed for settlement efforts and trials." (Judge #17)
"It has produced settlements in many cases or has limited the contested issues."
(Judge # 68)
"One benefit is all cases will go to trial within 12 months of filing. Without ADR I
estimate the waiting period would be at least 24 months." (Judge #97)
"My civil caseload would crash without ADR." (Judge # 150)
These responses speak to a judicial perception that the goal of efficient
justice is being achieved in some measure. Specifically, these responses sup-
port the achievement of the following objectives:
62
A reduction in the number of court trials;
Shorter time periods between filing and disposition; and
Saving of time and costs for courts.
If we ended our analysis of the empirical data here, it would be tempting
to conclude that in judges' opinions,63 the integration of court-connected medi-
ation into civil litigation has "worked." It has achieved, at least to a reasonable
degree, important justice goals. This positive data by itself, however, does not
address all of the specific objectives identified earlier. Moreover, further anal-
ysis of other data in the judicial survey suggests policy issues that require care-
ful attention, and even calls into question the heralded success of court-
connected mediation.'
for the parties and the court. Without a measurable link to the goals of substantive, procedu-
ral or efficient justice, however, increases in settlement alone do not signal ADR success.
62 Interestingly, there were two factors related to efficiency goals that were not chosen by
even 1/3 of the judges as "very important" in ordering cases to mediation: "case will take too
much court time," and "mediation will cost the parties less." (both 31%). McAoo, supra
note 43, at 17. This could be a sign of some agreement with what Chief Justice Burger said
at the time of the Pound Conference: efficiency is not an end in itself. POUND PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 7, at 32. It could also be a sign that judges do not expect most cases to go
to trial or do not believe that mediation reduces parties' costs. See infra Section II.A.6.a.
and section II.A.6.b.
63 At least in Minnesota, although many of these successes seem confirmed by the research
cited earlier. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
64 Professor Menkel-Meadow's prolific writing elsewhere recognizes many of the problems
we will address. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture:
A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or 'The Law of ADR, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from
the Adversary Conception of Lawyer's Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 407 (1997).
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4. Limitations in Court-Connected Mediation's Achievement of the
Goal of Substantive Justice
The judges' responses to questions in the survey revealed awareness of the
danger that ADR, particularly mandatory mediation, may actually threaten liti-
gants' rights to substantive justice. Judicial responses acknowledged that some
cases do, indeed, need their day in a real court.65 The survey asked the follow-
ing question: "When you do not order parties to ADR, please explain generally
why not." In their written answers, some judges responded as follows:
"Legal issue appears dispositive." (Judge # 51)
"A stark factual dispute regarding liability which requires a jury trial (e.g., one party
is adamant light was red and the other party is adamant light was green." (Judge #
108)
"I am still able to assure reasonably prompt disposition of cases in court and try to
accommodate parties and attorneys regarding scheduling. If they want to stay in
court, I am reluctant to order them out." (Judge # 136)
"I will consider withdrawing a case from ADR only if it is a case with no chance of
settlement and they need a trial, i.e., medical and legal malpractice mostly." (Judge #
15)
"[I don't order ADR] only if case is important precedent setting and the parties need
a court decision." (Judge # 97)
"Cost is too great or ADR would not be effective, e.g., parties refuse and want their
day in court." (Judge # 35)
Another survey question also gave judges an opportunity to weigh in on
the issue of a litigant's right to expect a judicial merits-based decision. The
question was: "If the parties are using a mediation process and one of them
files a motion for summary judgment, [do you rule on the motion first, or wait
for the result of the mediation] ?''66 Although almost two-thirds of the judges
responded that they would rule first,67 their written comments and the com-
ments of those who indicated that they would wait for the results of the media-
tion, underscore concerns about the potential negative effect of mandatory
ADR upon the substantive justice that is delivered by the courts. First, here are
some examples from those who answered "rule first:"
"My job is to decide these issues as soon as possible." (Judge # 103)
65 See John Wade, Don't Waste My Time on Negotiation and Mediation: This Dispute
Needs a Judge, 18 MEDIATION Q., No. 3, 259, 263 (2001) (A list of twenty-two indicators
for conflicts that may need a judicial decision, including: the need to shift resolution respon-
sibility elsewhere; the need for decision when there are no objective criteria to assist negotia-
tions ("indeterminate result, uncertain rules")); the need to control precedent; and the need
for decision when there is high conflict about low resources. Id. at 263-64. Judge Higgin-
botham also cautioned at the Pound Conference that "Some rights .... must be asserted
through traditional litigation processes." POUND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, at 88.
66 This issue is particularly interesting since there is data that confirms the likelihood of
settlement when the court rules on dispositive motions before a mediation process is under-
taken. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 6, at 18; see also Roselle Wissler, Court-Con-
nected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 641 (2002).
67 Only 17% of the judges specifically chose "wait for the result of the mediation," although
21% of the judges chose "other" as the answer to this question and wrote in such answers as
"depends on the case," "ask attorneys/parties," or, put the case on a "dual track." McADOO,
supra note 43, at 19.
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"Mediated settlement should be based on application of law to facts, not on fear of
the unknown." (Judge # 129)
"If party is entitled to dismissal then they shouldn't be coerced to settle." (Judge #
143)
"If there is an unanswered question of law, the parties cannot effectively mediate.
' 68
(Judge # 20)
In contrast, those judges who responded "mediate first" explained:
"Uncertainty breeds resolution." (Judge # 102)
"I tell each side to go to mediation assuming the summary judgment motion will be
granted in favor of the opponent." (Judge # 97)
"Let the parties reach their own settlement. They are more 'vested' in the outcome."
(Judge # 188)
"It is a needless expenditure of limited court time to rule on summary judgment when
the case may settle." (Judge #4)
"Don't bother the court until you have exhausted efforts." (Judge # 120)
It is difficult to avoid the worrisome conclusion that in a court-sanctioned
mediation program, at least some parties may be denied merits-based adjudica-
tion when they are entitled to it, have requested it and would prefer it. This
result would be inconsistent with the substantive justice objective of "outcomes
that are consistent with the rule of law."6 9
Such concerns become even stronger when considering judges' treatment
of pro se parties. One survey question asked judges to assume that represented
parties or pro se litigants had filed a case and did not voluntarily choose ADR.
Judges were asked how often they would:
MENTION ADR to the attorneys or pro se parties;
REQUEST attorneys or parties to consider the use of ADR; or
ORDER ADR when attorneys or parties had not chosen to pursue it.
70
It was hoped that judges would view these choices as representing a con-
tinuum of judicial action on ADR, and it was assumed that many more judges
would MENTION or REQUEST ADR than ORDER its use, especially when pro se
parties were involved. The data largely illustrate judicial acceptance and rou-
tine use of ADR, including judicial proclivity to order pro se parties to use
ADR. 7 ' (See Figure 1).
68 Judges also noted that one of the reasons attorneys give when they do not want to use
mediation is a planned dispositive motion. Id. at 15.
69 Along with the efficient justice/appropriate forum goal of "an opportunity for parties to
choose the most appropriate process for their case."
70 The answer choices for each part of the question were: never, rarely, occasionally, usu-
ally or always. McADOO, supra note 43, at app. A, 2.
71 There are some problems with the numbers of responses to the individual parts of this
question, suggesting some confusion in the instructions. The numbers of respondents are
large enough, however, to allow for analysis and to draw some conclusions.
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FIGuRE 1:





Pro se parties 70%
Request Use of ADR
Represented Parties 82%
Pro se Parties 67%
Order ADR
Represented Parties 49%
Pro se Parties 43%
Mandatory mediation for unrepresented parties raises especially grave
concerns. 3 Mediation is a largely informal and confidential process.74 In
court-connected mediation, mediator interventions often include evaluative
techniques such as assessing the strengths and weaknesses of parties' cases,
predicting court outcomes, and proposing possible settlement options.7 5 The
mediators, however, are largely unregulated, and few courts operate rigorous
monitoring systems, or any systems at all.76 The potential for coercion is very
real, and suggests that court-connected mediation's substantive justice goal
could be jeopardized by the over-enthusiastic use of mandatory mediation.
Finally, judges do not appear to consider the maintenance of party rela-
tionships or the development of remedies based on extra-legal (or simply non-
legal) norms as particularly compelling substantive justice objectives. Looking
again at the survey question regarding factors that judges consider when order-
ing parties to mediation, few selected either "continuing relationship to pre-
serve" or "relief is outside the court's jurisdiction."77 The potential for
mediation to be helpful in cases with continuing relationships, long a favorite
72 When the responses to this question were separately analyzed for the Twin Cities
metropolitan area 64% of these judges said they would "order" pro se parties into
mediation. McADOO, supra note 43, at 16.
73 To be fair, many judges (about 20%) recognized factors such as "domestic violence,"
"unequal bargaining," "highly emotionally charged parties," and "parties are too hostile," as
possible cases or parties "inappropriate for mediation." McAdoo, supra note 43, at 18. This
hardly covers the ground of possible issues implicated in ordering pro se parties to
mediation.
14 Dr. Iur. Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party Empowerment - Against a Good-Faith
Requirement in Mandatory Mediation, 23 REV. LITIG. 1, 16 (2004).
75 See Welsh, supra note 32 at 805-09, 846-51 (regarding the preference for evaluative
interventions by mediators in court-connected mediation).
76 For example, one expects that courts with mandatory court-connected mediation pro-
grams will at least take the responsibility for ensuring the availability of a sufficient number
of qualified neutrals. Soc'Y FOR PROF'L IN Disp. RESOL., MANDATED PARTICIPATION &
SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS (1991). Yet
in Minnesota, over 40% of the judges located outside the Twin Cities metropolitan area
raised the concern that there were only an "adequate, but quite limited" or "not enough"
qualified neutrals. McADoo, supra note 43, at 11,
77 These factors were chosen by only 28% and 13% of the judges. McADOO, supra note 43
at 17.
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mantra of mediation advocates,78 rarely fares well in the empirical work on
ADR. 79 And although it is true that apologies and other non-legal relief some-
times are achieved in mediation, the data suggest that these outcomes are not
what judges expect, experience or value when they order parties to mediation.8 0
As observed above in Section II.A. 1, it appears that some substantive jus-
tice objectives are being achieved through the use of court-connected media-
tion.8' Some of the same substantive justice objectives, however, can be
negatively affected, especially in a mandatory program. Other substantive jus-
tice objectives are simply not relevant to most trial court judges. From the
foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that:
Outcomes might not be consistent with rule of law;
Outcomes might not be responsive to litigant needs;
Outcomes might not be perceived as fair; or
Outcomes are unlikely to maintain or improve relationships.
5. Limitations in Court-Connected Mediation's Achievement of the
Goal of Procedural Justice
The judicial survey responses suggest that procedural justice goals are dis-
counted in court-connected mediation. For example, in answer to the question
of whether it is important that clients be present at the mediation session, only
70% of responding judges answered in the affirmative for all cases.8 2 It could
be argued that those judges (29%) who felt that clients needed only to be pre-
sent in most cases were thinking about personal injury cases (often attended
only by insurance company representatives).83 It is problematic, however, to
find any judges assuming that it can be appropriate to exclude the parties from
a court-provided process. Procedural justice can be achieved only if parties
have an opportunity to express themselves and be heard in an even-handed,
respectful process. If parties do not attend their mediation session, they are
extraordinarily unlikely to perceive that they were offered such an
opportunity."
78 See supra text accompanying notes 20-23 (regarding Lon Fuller's description of
mediation).
79 -See McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42 at 429; Dwight Golann, Is Legal Mediation
a Process of Repair - or Separation? An Empirical Study and it Implications, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 301, 331 (2002) ("Even when able mediators work with parties whose dis-
pute arises in the context of a significant prior connection with each other, relationship
repairs in legal mediation appear to be uncommon events."); Roselle R. Wissler, The Effec-
tiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55,
67 (2004) (The highest percentage from various studies stated that 43% of litigants thought
mediation improved relationships with other party; most studies did not support this.).
80 Obviously the goal of an outcome that is "responsive to litigant needs" (e.g., considers
relationship issues and extra-judicial remedies) may conflict with that of ensuring an out-
come consistent with the rule of law; we are concerned that the "rule of law" outcome is so
pervasive that it always trumps all others.
81 See supra text accompanying notes 48-57.
82 McADoo, supra note 43, at 23.
83 There was no follow up question.
84 They are also less likely to perceive that they exercised "self-determination" in their
decision-making. See Welsh, supra note 31, at 18-19 & 40 (contrasting the original, par-
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An analysis of the answers to this one question suggests limitations in
court-connected mediation's achievement of its procedural justice objectives.
The data indicate that in court-connected mediation:
The parties might not have the opportunity to express themselves;
The parties might not have the opportunity to be heard by someone involved in deci-
sion-making;
The parties might not perceive that they have been treated in an even-handed and
dignified manner; or
The parties might not perceive mediation as fair.
6. Limitations on Court-Connected Mediation's Achievement of the
Goal of Efficient Justice in an Appropriate Forum
As noted above in Section II.A.3, the pre-existing settlement culture of the
courts represents fertile soil within which court-connected mediation programs
have grown, and judges particularly value mediation's contribution to the set-
tlement of cases.85 The judges' responses to the survey raise questions, how-
ever, about whether there really is more efficient justice as a result of court-
connected mediation. In Minnesota, and in many other parts of the country,
there is no consistent data collection, monitoring, or evaluation regarding time
or cost savings.8 6 Unfortunately, there has been little effort to follow Chief
Justice Burger's astute admonition at the Pound Conference: "When we make
changes, their operation must be monitored to be sure they are working as we
intended."87
Two main points raised by the judges cast particular doubt on court-con-
nected mediation's achievement of the goal of efficient justice:88 (1) cases set-
tle anyway;8 9 and (2) mediation actually may increase some parties' costs.
ticipatory vision of party self-determination with a vision that focuses narrowly on clients'
control over the decision "to agree or not to agree").
85 See Section II.A.3 supra.
86 Professor Deborah Hensler has long questioned the claim of time and cost savings in
ADR. She writes: "The discrepancy between subjective and objective data gives empiricists
pause" and has been forceful in asking for more research that compares mediation to "old-
fashioned negotiation" rather than trial in order to develop a more accurate picture of media-
tion. See Deborah Hensler, A Research Agenda: What We Need to Know About Court-
Connected ADR, Disp. RESOL. MAG. 15, 16 (1999). See also McAdoo & Welsh, supra note
6, at 39-40 (providing ideas for collecting quantitative and qualitative data).
87 POUND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, at 29. There was also emphasis "on the paucity of
data available for an adequate understanding of the reasons for the critical problems of judi-
cial administration and for informed consideration of the alternatives to judicial resolution of
disputes." Id. at 329.
88 Particularly because some objective data has been gathered regarding mediation's lack of
success in achieving cost and time savings, we recognize the danger in relying on judicial
perceptions to reach conclusions here. We also note, however, that much of the data regard-
ing cost and time savings relies upon attorneys' perceptions which may also be suspect.
89 Also noted was the observation that because ADR is available for so few cases overall,
any effect on the court is extremely limited. "I think ADR does settle some cases that might
otherwise reach trial. But to be frank, in our courts in which we handle on a regular basis all
types of cases, only a small percentage of which ADR even applies to, the impact of ADR on
the work load is almost imperceptible." (Judge # 198). McADoo, supra note 43, at 13.
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a. Cases Settle Anyway
Judges were clear about the perceived settlement value of ADR. A few,
however, questioned whether ADR actually was the cause of settlement. In
response to the question of why they do NOT order ADR, three representative
answers follow: 90
"If parties or attorneys feel they can negotiate a settlement, why have ADR?" (Judge
# 91)
"I do not believe ADR should be mandatory in every single case.... To require
[attorneys who can settle their own cases] to spend additional time and money on
mediation when they have already used their best efforts to settle the case is a waste
of both the time and expense." (Judge # 34)
"Experienced attorneys usually can settle cases without mediation." (Judge # 161)
Comments from judges about changes in their judicial workload included
these:9'
"Given the high number of cases that settle before trial I am assuming that ADR has
a significant impact. However, it is difficult to know how many of these same cases
would settle even without ADR."92 (Judge # 25)
"I believe cases are settled earlier, but I'm not sure the number of cases settled has
changed." (Judge # 193)
"How can we know for sure[?]" (Judge # 46)
Finally, one judge gave this "suggestion" to the Supreme Court:
"I would like to ... study to see if ADR is effective. Many factors grant settlement
of cases." (Judge # 2)
93
b. Mediation May Increase Costs
The need for cost effective dispute resolution was often cited at the Pound
Conference, and there is the potential for such savings from the use of media-
tion. But the judges' responses indicate that mediation does not uniformly
offer this benefit. On the issue of costs, 94 for example, one judge said s/he
didn't order ADR when the "[c]ost and time spent isn't [sic] justified by value
of case or amount in controversy." (Judge # 57).95 Another concurred that
when it is "too expensive in relation to [the] controversy," (Judge # 100), the
case is not appropriate for mediation. Queried for reasons attorneys give when
they prefer not to use ADR, the top reason was that it "would add cost to the
case." 96 Finally, in a question asking for complaints about the use of ADR,
almost one-third of the judges answered that they have received complaints,
and over half of these were about cost and delay issues, e.g., mediation adds "a
layer of time, complexity and cost."'9 7 (Judge # 169).
90 Id. at 13-14.
91 Id.
92 Another key reason attorneys give judges for why they don't want to use ADR is that
settlement has already been attempted. Id. at 16.
93 Id. at app. C, 15.
94 Recall that the opportunity to "save costs" was not a key reason judges order mediation.
Id. at 17.
95 Id. at 13.
96 Id. at 15.
97 Id. at 21.
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Reducing the amount of discovery done in a case would have a particu-
larly potent effect on the time and cost savings experienced by parties. If medi-
ation only replaces bilateral attorney.negotiations on the courthouse steps or a
last-minute judicial settlement conference, the potential for significant savings
is limited. Previous research has concluded that most mediation occurs after
almost all discovery has been completed,98 and we have written elsewhere that
this practice limits the efficiency achieved by mediation. 99 A majority of Min-
nesota's judges (57%) confirmed that mediation occurs after all or almost all
discovery is completed. However, 25% of this majority indicated their belief
that mediation could and should take place either after limited targeted discov-
ery has been done, or before much discovery has been done. 1"m
The data also suggest limitations upon court-connected mediation's
achievement of the goal of providing alternative, potentially more appropriate
forums to litigants. As noted above in Section II.A.4, in the discussion of sub-
stantive justice, courts using mandatory mediation are ordering parties into this
process even when the parties or their attorneys do not perceive it as the most
appropriate process. Further, even though court-connected mediation is a con-
fidential, informal, largely-unregulated process, substantial numbers of pro se
litigants are being ordered to participate in it. Last, even though court-con-
nected mediation is often described as a "facilitative" process, i.e., invoking a
new problem-solving, consensual paradigm that might better serve parties'
needs, the process is often characterized by evaluative interventions similar to
interventions used traditionally by judges in settlement conferences.
Though there is a lack of definitive data, the available evidence points
toward serious limitations upon any claim that court-connected mediation helps
the courts to achieve more efficient justice or the matching of cases with appro-
priate forums:
The use of ADR might not save (and may even increase) time and costs for parties;
The use of ADR might not save time and costs for the court;
Cases in ADR might not have shorter time periods between filing and disposition;
The number of court trials might not decrease or even be related to the amount of
ADR;
Forums might not be matched to the needs of the case and the litigants; or
Parties might not have the opportunity to access the process they believe will be most
appropriate for the resolution of their case.
7. Conclusions from the Judicial Perspective
Judges perceive the potential for mediation to deliver "justice:" to ensure a
fair outcome consistent with what might be achieved in court; to provide a
process that includes the litigants; and to promote a speedier, less costly way to
get to this resolution. Their responses also point out, however, that success in
achieving substantive justice is not ensured, especially when mediation is
98 McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 472-73; Wissler, supra note 79 (in some
programs, design features promote earlier mediation; in many, most or all discovery is com-
pleted prior to mediation.).
99 Bobbi McAdoo et al., Institutionalization: What do Empirical Studies Tell Us About
Court Mediation?, 9 Disp. REs. MAG 8, 9 (2003).
10 MCADOO, supra note 43, at 22.
[Vol. 5:399
Winter 2004/05] LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP AND KEEP ON LOOKING 419
mandatory. Sometimes, judges apparently are abrogating their responsibility to
provide access to the courts or to rule on specific legal issues, when litigants
are entitled to court action. One Minnesota judge wrote, "Parties are discour-
aged from using the court system."'' l Another opined: "Mediated agreement
doesn't provide sense of fair process or fair result - but rather, just a cheaper
result they will live with."' ' As the last judge's remark suggests, mediation
also may not serve the goal of procedural justice. This is particularly true if the
parties are not included in the process, perceive their participation as dis-
counted, or ultimately fail to conclude that they are receiving "respectful atten-
tion and thoughtful consideration" from the court.10 3 Last, there is a danger
that court-connected mediation is not achieving the goal of efficient justice.
Mediation actually can increase time and costs. Most cases settle without
mediation, and it appears that few discovery costs are being saved in the pre-
sent court-connected mediation environment.
This article focuses on the perceptions of judges, but attorneys and liti-
gants are also important stakeholders in the civil litigation system. Therefore,
the Article now briefly reviews the literature regarding these stakeholders' per-
ceptions in order to determine whether they support or contradict those of the
judges.
B. The Attorneys' Perspectives
Empirical work on attorney perspectives also supports the conclusion that
ADR has achieved widespread institutionalization, but does not clearly signal
whether the goals of substantive, procedural and efficient justice have been
achieved.
1. Court-Connected Mediation's Achievement of the Goal of
Substantive Justice
Attorneys view mediation primarily as a faster and less expensive route to
settlement, 1°4 though various research studies also indicate that attorneys per-
ceive most mediated outcomes as fair. 105 Attorneys view settlement as more
likely if mediators engage in evaluative activities that help parties see where
101 Id. at 22 (Judge # 191).
102 Id. (Judge # 172).
103 See supra note 13.
104 See STIENSTRA, supra note 38, at 187 (attorneys choose mediation to resolve the case
more quickly); KEITH SCHILDT ET AL., MAJOR CIVIL CASE MEDIATION PILOT PROGRAM:
17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS, PRELIMINARY REPORT (N. Ill. Univ., 1994); Bobbi
McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 Mo.
L. REV. 473, 512-13 (2002) (reporting that top factors motivating lawyers to choose media-
tion are: saving litigation expenses (85%) and speeding settlement (76%)).
105 JULIE MACFARLANE, LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: AN EVALUATION OF THE SASKATCHE-
WAN QUEEN'S BENCH MANDATORY MEDIATION PROGRAM, WINDSOR, ONTARIO: UNIV. OF
WINDSOR (2003), http://www.saskjustice.gov.sk.ca/DisputeResolution/pus/QBCivil Evalua-
tions.pdf.; SCHILDT, supra note 104, at 28 (83% of attorneys thought settlement outcomes
were fair); Wissler, supra note 66, at 667 (75% of attorneys thought settlement was fair).
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their cases fit within "the shadow of the law."'10 6 Not surprisingly then, attor-
neys seek mediators who are litigators and have relevant substantive exper-
tise. 10 7 Also not surprisingly, few lawyers perceive mediation as increasing
their clients' control." 8 Ultimately, attorneys choose mediation because of its
ability to provide a reality check for their own clients or opposing parties10 9
and thus ease settlement. Together, attorneys' focus on settlement and their
powerful "philosophical map" push parties towards the substantive justice
objective of achieving "outcomes consistent with the rule of law."
It is highly questionable whether mediation promotes many settlements
that meet litigants' needs by involving something other than monetary
rewards.'1 0 Certainly, the achievement of extra-legal outcomes is not why law-
yers generally choose mediation; nor is there much empirical support for the
proposition that attorneys choose mediation to preserve ongoing relation-
ships." 1 Moreover, when lawyers do not want to use ADR, it is often because
they believe they can settle their own cases on the same terms as those achieved
in mediation, again raising the question of whether mediation is truly "value-
added."
1 1 2
2. Court-Connected Mediation's Achievement of the Goal of
Procedural Justice
According to lawyers, mediators allow clients to be more involved in the
resolution of their cases than they would be otherwise. 13 Lawyers perceive
mediators as effective in engaging parties in meaningful discussion, 114 and they
notice mediators' encouragement of client participation. 1 5 Attorneys view
mediators as neutral and the mediation process as fair.'1 6 They also report that
mediation results in a less adversarial process.117 All of these observations
106 Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 986-87 (1979).
107 McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 475. In Missouri research similar to that
conducted in Minnesota, 87% of the attorney respondents wanted mediators who knew "how
to value a case." McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 104, at 513.
10 McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42 at 473; STIENSTRA, supra note 38, at 217
(Attorneys did think client attendance helped with settlement).
109 McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 428-30, 472.
110 Id. at 471.
Il. STIENSTRA, supra note 38, at 187; McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 472; but
see Wissler, supra note 66, at 664 (32% of attorneys believed that mediation improved
parties' relationship).
112 Research in North Carolina found that mediated settlement outcomes were indistinguish-
able from conventional negotiation settlements, see Stevens H. Clarke & Elizabeth Gordon,
Public Sponsorship of Private Settling: Court-Ordered Civil Case Mediation, 19 Jus. Sys.
J. 311, 321 (1997).
113 STIENSTRA, supra note 38, at 204.
114 Wissler, supra note 66, at 663.
115 McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 474.
116 Wissler, supra note 66, at 663; SCHILDT, supra note 104, at 27.
117 McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 473. An interesting look at how difficult it is
for lawyers to change their philosophical map can be found in Milton Heumann & Jonathan
Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jersey: "You Can't
Always Get What You Want," 12 Omo ST. J. oN Disp. RESOL. 253, 257 (1997) (Even though
litigators would like the methods used in their negotiations to be more "problem-solving"
[Vol. 5:399
Winter 2004/05] LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP AND KEEP ON LOOKING 421
suggest that court-connected mediation is delivering procedural justice, particu-
larly in comparison to bilateral settlement negotiations between attorneys. 1
1 8
However, in deciding whether to use mediation, lawyers rarely focus on
whether their clients like mediation, nor do most attorneys perceive mediation
as increasing client satisfaction.1 1 9 So although the data from lawyers support
progress on the achievement of some procedural justice objectives, the data
also suggest that lawyers view client participation primarily as a means to reach
settlement, not to ensure clients an experience of procedural justice.
3. Court-Connected Mediation's Achievement of the Goal of Efficient
Justice in an Appropriate Forum
As was the case with the judicial survey data, lawyers choose ADR for the
achievement of efficiency objectives directly tied to settlement. They want
someone to facilitate settlement discussions, reduce litigation time and costs,
and resolve their cases more quickly.12° According to some studies, attorneys
perceive that these objectives are being met.121
On the other hand, objective data raise doubts about whether settlement
rates increase or trial rates decrease with the use of mediation. 122 Further, most
lawyers perceive that neither the volume nor the timing of their discovery has
changed as a result of the institutionalization of mediation. 123 When asked why
they do not go to ADR, many attorneys answer that they settle their cases with-
out the use of ADR.1 24 Thus, despite lawyers' positive assessment of media-
tion, it is not at all clear that court-connected mediation is helping the courts to
achieve efficient justice in appropriate forums.
and less "positional," this has not happened, perhaps because of a "combination of persistent
litigator habits, a limited vocabulary of negotiation, and the time and expense necessary to
change established practices").
118 See Welsh, supra note 32, at 839-46, 852-55 (urging that if disputants are present in
mediation sessions, their ability to observe all of the actors makes it more likely that they
will perceive that they had "voice," were heard, and were treated in an even-handed and
dignified manner).
119 McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 473; STIENSTRA, supra note 38, at 217
(attorneys did think client attendance helped with settlement).
120 McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 472; STIENSTRA, supra note 38, at 21 (attor-
neys expect ADR to help settle cases; when it does not, their view of the process becomes
less positive); Wissler, supra note 66, at 664.
121 McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 473; ST1ENSTRA, supra note 38 at 192-93,
249; but see Wissler, supra note 66, at 664-65 (various program reports mixed results on
these factors); Hensler, supra note 86, at 15-16. See also Clarke & Gordon, supra note 112,
at 332 (settlement involved lower costs than going to trial, but mediated settlement was not
cheaper than conventional unassisted settlement).
122 Clarke & Gordon, supra note 112, at 326. See also Wissler, supra note 66, at 669-71;
Hensler, supra note 86, at 15-16.
123 In both Minnesota and Missouri, about 2/3 of the lawyers responded "no change" in
either the volume or timing of discovery. The predominant reason for not reducing the
volume of discovery was that "case circumstances usually require full discovery before case
is ready for mediation." See McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 472-73; McAdoo &
Hinshaw, supra note 104, at 584-85. See also STIENSTRA, supra note 38, at 192. But see
Wissler, supra note 66, at 694 (cites to several studies where the design of the program
ensured an early mediation, and then discovery was decreased.).
124 McAdoo, Lawyer Report, supra note 42, at 466.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
4. Conclusions from the Attorneys' Perspectives
The phrase "business as usual" seems to capture attorneys' perceptions of
court-connected mediation programs. 125 Attorneys using the process perceive
that they still:
Step 1: File the case;
Step 2: Do all necessary (often extensive) discovery; and
Step 3: Settle the case just before trial.
126
Because the mediation process is overseen by a lawyer who is probably a
substantive expert in the subject matter of the litigation, settlement generally
occurs within the "shadow of the law," thus suggesting that outcomes are con-
sistent with the rule of law. However, most of the other substantive justice
objectives - responsiveness to litigant needs; consistency with party self-deter-
mination; and improvements in relationships - are not even acknowledged,
much less achieved. As for the procedural justice objectives, because court-
connected mediation generally includes the parties, it is more likely than tradi-
tional lawyer-only settlement negotiations (or judge-supervised settlement con-
ferences) to leave the parties feeling that they have experienced justice. But,
because lawyers dominate both negotiation and mediation, they find it difficult
to appreciate the significance of procedural justice and how the experience of
procedural justice could vary between the processes. Last, it is far from clear
that settlement rates have actually increased or that expensive discovery is
reduced as a result of using mediation, although attorneys perceive that media-
tion has promoted some time and cost savings.12 7
C. The Parties' Perspectives
In this section, we finally turn to the perspectives of the stakeholders who
are not dominant players in the civil litigation system, but are the people for
whom the civil litigation system exists: the litigants. Unfortunately, because
these are not the dominant players, there is relatively little in-depth data regard-
ing parties' perceptions of court-connected mediation.' 2 8
1. Court-Connected Mediation's Achievement of the Goal of
Substantive Justice
In general, and regardless of the interventions used by mediators, most
parties participating in court-connected mediation perceive mediated settle-
125 Bobbi McAdoo, The Future of ADR: Have They Come for the Right Reason?, 3 J. ALT.
Disp. RESOL. IN EMP. 2 (2001).
126 Id.
127 Professor Hensler explains this phenomenon this way: "[s]ince every lawsuit has a small
probability of going to trial and since the costs of trial can be enormous, it would not be
surprising for those costs to loom large in individuals' subjective calculus of savings associ-
ated with ADR." Hensler, supra note 86, at 16.
128 See Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations
with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 573, 594-600 (2004) (describing the limited qualitative data available regard-
ing parties' perceptions).
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ments as fair or are satisfied with them.129 Interestingly, however, parties seem
to judge the process of court-connected mediation as fairer when mediators
evaluate the merits of cases.1 30 This reaction suggests that like judges and
attorneys, parties who are involved in court-connected procedures prefer and
appreciate mediators' help in achieving outcomes that are consistent with the
rule of law.
1 3 '
A majority of parties also perceive that they had input in determining
mediated outcomes. 132 It is not so clear, however, that parties perceive that
they control the outcomes of mediation sessions (or, in other words, exercise
self-determination). 133 Further, few parties perceive mediation as improving
their relationships. 134 Most parties, in fact, view mediation as having no effect
on relationships.
1 35
2. Court-Connected Mediation's Achievement of the Goal of
Procedural Justice
As observed above, people turn to the civil litigation system for resolution
based on "respectful attention and thoughtful consideration.'136 In other
words, they seek procedural justice. Processes are more likely to be perceived
as fair if they possess the following characteristics: an opportunity for parties
to be heard (also called "voice"), thoughtful consideration of the parties' views
129 SCHILDT, supra note 104, at 25-27; PHILIP J. HARTER & MICHAEL Fix, HARD CASES,
VULNERABLE PEOPLE: AN ANALYSIS OF MEDIATION PROGRAMS AT THE MULTI-DOOR
COURTHOUSE OF SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 68-69, 140-41 (The Urban
Institute 1992).
130 Wissler, supra note 66, at 679-80, 684-85.
131 People turn to the civil litigation system because they seek some form of resolution that
also will offer accountability and either compensation or a change in the status quo. See
Deborah Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND
TROUBLE CASES, 155-163 (A. Sarat et al eds., 1998) (contrasting tort plaintiffs' desire for
accountability and vindication of their legal rights with lawyers' monetary focus in assessing
claims); Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the
Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. Svs. J. 151, 153 (1984) (once plaintiffs seek assistance from
courts or attorneys, they want vindication); Welsh, supra note 128, at 663 (concluding from
interviews that disputants value mediation primarily for the procedural justice and progress
toward resolution that it offers). These preferences suggest that plaintiffs who have made
their way through the naming-blaming-claiming cycle seek outcomes based on the applica-
tion of social norms recognized as legitimate. And when plaintiffs invoke the power of the
courts, it is reasonable to assume that they seek the application of legal norms. Robert
Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for Community, 18 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp RESOL. 27, 55 (2002); James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the Estab-
lishment of a Mediation Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 457, 487 (1996).
132 R. J. MAIMAN, MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT: AN EVALUATION OF
SELECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS IN THE MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT 14, 44 (1997);
SCHILDT, supra note 104, at 29-30.
133 See Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A
Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 179, 182-84 (2002).
134 MAIMAN, supra note 132, at 8, 9, 35, 37.
135 See Wissler, supra note 79 (summarizing research regarding the perceived effect of
mediation on relationships).
136 POUND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7; see also Welsh, supra note 128, at 663.
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by the decision-maker, and even-handed and dignified treatment for the
parties. 
137
Most parties participating in court-connected mediation perceive that they
received a sufficient opportunity to present their views 138 and that the mediator
understood the issues in dispute. 139 Further, most parties perceive mediators as
treating them with respect, 140 remaining neutral14 ' and not pressuring them into
settlement.142 Ultimately, most parties judge court-connected mediation to be a
fair process. 143 Their assessments are even more likely to be positive if their
attorneys prepared them for mediation' 44 and/or if opposing counsel was coop-
erative during the mediation session.'4' The simple fact of court-mandated
participation in mediation does not appear to reduce parties' satisfaction with
the process or their assessments of process fairness. 14 6 Overall, then, it appears
that court-connected mediation has been successful in achieving the very
important goal of providing procedural justice. Further, achievement of this
goal makes it more likely that parties will perceive that they have received
substantive justice1 i47
Some mediator interventions, however, cause parties' perceptions of pro-
cedural justice to suffer. When mediators recommend a particular settlement,
parties are more likely to feel pressured to settle and less likely to perceive the
process as fair. 148 Parties also are bringing a small but growing number of
complaints about mediators to courts and disciplinary bodies. 149 Many of these
complaints involve allegations that mediators behaved in a coercive manner
and/or permitted one of the parties to behave in a coercive manner, thus under-
mining the neutrality, dignity and mutual respect that parties expected to find in
the mediation process. In addition, research suggests that parties' perceptions
of mediation's process fairness are likely to suffer if court-connected mediation
programs do not permit or require parties to attend mediation sessions. 150
Though aggressive mediator behaviors and the occasional exclusion of parties
137 See Welsh, supra note 32, at 817.
138 See HARTER & Fix, supra note 129, at 77-78, 151-152.
139 See R.G. HANN & C. BAAR, EVALUATION OF THE ONTARIO MANDATORY MEDIATION
PROGRAM (RULE 24.1): FINAL REPORT - THE FIRST 23 MONTHS 16 (2001), http://
www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/html/MANMED; MAIMAN, supra note 132, at 44.
140 See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA, REPORT ON
MEDIATION 17-18 (2002), http://www.ned.uscourts.gov/mediation/medweb /report-02.pdf
[hereinafter "NEBRASKA REPORT"].
141 See SCHILDT, supra note 104, at 29.
142 See id. at 30.
14 Id. at 23-24, 27; see MAIMAN, supra note 132, at 11-12, 14-15, 40, 43-44; Clark &
Gordon, supra note 112, at 323.
144 See Wissler, supra note 66, at 698.
141 See id. at 686.
146 See id. at 697.
147 See Welsh, supra note 32, at 818.
148 See Wissler, supra note 79.
149 See Welsh, supra note 31, at 9; but see James Coben, Mediation Case Law: 2003 in
Review, 15 WORLD ARa. MEDIATION REP. 163 (2004) (listing no litigated cases in 2003
involving allegations of mediator misbehavior).
150 See Welsh, supra note 32, at 838-39; E. Allan Lind, In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort
Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 953, 963 (1990).
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from mediation sessions may be viewed as producing more efficient settle-
ments, these process characteristics also do not serve the procedural justice
goal.
3. Court-Connected Mediation's Achievement of the Goal of Efficient
Justice in an Appropriate Forum
Though few parties have any real basis for judging the relative efficiency
of court-connected mediation, parties have evaluated mediation quite favorably.
They perceive mediation as more efficient than litigation151 and as reducing
costs.' 5 2 In the only study that assessed parties' perceptions of early court-
mandated mediation - held before all discovery was completed - the parties
were quite positive about the benefits of beginning negotiations earlier.' 5 3 For
the parties, then, it appears that court-connected mediation does deliver effi-
cient justice.
4. Conclusions from the Parties' Perspectives
Overall, the parties participating in court-connected mediation perceive
the process as achieving two of the objectives that evidence substantive justice.
Court-connected mediation produces fair outcomes and, especially when
mediators evaluate parties' cases, provides some reassurance that outcomes are
consistent with the rule of law. The goal of procedural justice also seems to be
achieved by court-connected mediation - except when mediators engage in
aggressively evaluative behaviors, permit one of the parties to behave in a coer-
cive manner, or exclude the parties from mediation sessions. Last, limited data
indicates that parties perceive that the goal of efficient justice is being
achieved.
III. PROPOSALS FOR COURT PROCESSES
What does this data suggest regarding reforms to court-connected media-
tion programs that would help courts to achieve the goals of substantive justice,
procedural justice, and efficient justice in an appropriate forum?
A. Achieving the Goal of Substantive Justice
1. Courts should permit parties seeking a merits-based decision to opt out easily
from a mandatory mediation program.
2. Courts should require that parties receive timely rulings on merits-dispositive
motions, regardless of whether they are in mediation.
3. Courts should clarify that their primary objectives are to provide outcomes that
are: perceived as fair; consistent with the rule of law; and likely to be durable.
Much less significant are the objectives of providing outcomes that respond to
151 See WAYNE KOBBERVIG, MEDIATION OF CIVIL CASES IN HENNEPIN COUNTY: AN EvAL-
UATION 24 (1991).
152 See HANN & BAAR, supra note 139, at 9; NEBRASKA REPORT, supra note 140, at 19.
153 See HANN & BAAR, supra note 139, at 7.
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litigants' needs, represent the exercise of parties' self-determination or maintain
or enhance relationships.
154
In many ways, court-connected mediation is structured to achieve the goal
of substantive justice, if that goal is reduced to include only two objectives -
producing outcomes that are consistent with the rule of law and that are per-
ceived as fair. The parties' attorneys can select mediators who have relevant
substantive expertise, and many court-connected mediators educate parties and
attorneys regarding the application of the law to their cases. However, a signif-
icant percentage of judges seem to be using court-connected mediation in a
manner that could be inconsistent with producing outcomes consistent with the
rule of law. Rather, these judges are using court-connected mediation as a
mechanism to ration parties' access to pure merits-based adjudication. Pro se
litigants are forced to participate in mediation, and judges may decline to rule
on summary judgment motions until mediation has been attempted. Mandatory
mediation makes these judicial choices possible. At the very least, mandatory
mediation programs should be changed to permit parties to opt out easily and to
receive timely rulings on merits-based dispositive motions. This arrangement
would allow mediation to remain the new "default" process - thus increasing
the likelihood that parties will use it'5 5 - but would also provide parties with
the power to place meaningful limits upon some judges' tendency to order par-
ties into ADR inappropriately.
Meanwhile, the perspectives of judges, attorneys and parties suggest that
most of the other objectives raised by participants at the Pound Conference and
in subsequent years are relatively unimportant in the civil non-family court-
connected context. Few stakeholders in the civil non-family context seem to
worry about producing outcomes that respond to litigants' unique extra-legal
needs or represent parties' self-determination or maintain or enhance relation-
ships. If they are honest, courts will clarify that though these objectives are
laudable, they must yield to the objectives that are more salient to the mission
of a public civil litigation system.
B. Achieving the Goal of Procedural Justice
1. Courts should prohibit mediator recommendations regarding appropriate
settlements.
2. Courts should prohibit the use of over-aggressive evaluative interventions by
mediators that diminish the opportunities for parties to be heard and understood
and/or to be treated in an even-handed, dignified manner.
3. Courts should always encourage the parties to attend mediation sessions.
4. Courts should establish monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure the
quality of mediator performance, with emphasis upon procedural justice factors.
154 We believe these represent important objectives and, theoretically, the courts could com-
mit to the institutionalization of a different, "alternative" paradigm that aims at their achieve-
ment. The data described in this article, however, lead us to be skeptical about the likelihood
that the courts will embrace such a paradigm, at least for civil non-family cases. As a result,
we recommend that the courts be realistic and clear about the objectives that they will seek
to achieve.
155 See RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 80-81 (2002) (describ-
ing the status quo bias and the power of a "law-supplied default").
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5. Courts should establish ethical requirements for mediators, as well as easily-
accessible grievance procedures.
Though judges and attorneys seem to have little understanding of the inde-
pendent importance of procedural justice, it appears that parties generally per-
ceive mediation as a procedurally just process. There are exceptions, however,
when mediators propose particular settlements or behave too aggressively, or
permit one of the parties to behave too aggressively, or exclude the parties from
all or part of mediation sessions. Court rules should make it clear that the
parties are always invited and even expected to attend mediation sessions.
They should also make it clear that mediation is expected to be a dignified
process. Further, based on the data described supra, even if courts allow or
encourage mediators to provide their assessments of parties' cases, courts
should prohibit mediator recommendations regarding appropriate settlements
and over-aggressive evaluation. In some sense at least, courts are delegating
one of their judicial functions to court-connected mediators. The courts ulti-
mately should remain accountable for their delegates' performance. Therefore,
effective monitoring and evaluation, including ethical requirements and griev-
ance procedures, should always accompany court-connected mediation
programs.
C. Achieving the Goal of Efficient Justice and Appropriate Forums
1. Again, courts should permit parties seeking a merits-based decision to opt out
easily from a mandatory mediation program.
2. Courts should require the use of court-connected mediation earlier in the discov-
ery stage.
3. Courts should establish monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that measure
whether or not programs are providing cost and time savings.
Often, mediation advocates have used efficiency arguments to persuade
courts to adopt mediation programs. It is striking that even though objective
measures often do not prove that mediation is saving courts and/or parties' time
and money, judges and attorneys perceive that it is doing so. Courts should
require earlier use of court-connected mediation, perhaps after essential discov-
ery has been completed, but certainly well before trial. Then this change
should be evaluated to determine whether the phantom savings perceived by
judges and lawyers are actually realized. In addition, the earlier use of media-
tion should be evaluated for its effect on perceptions of substantive and proce-
dural justice.
D. Overall Proposal
1. Courts should seek, and legislatures should provide, funding to ensure a suffi-
cient number of judges, support staff, courtrooms, etc., as well as high-quality
adjunct processes such as court-connected mediation.
To this point, we have made concrete proposals focused on using court-
connected mediation programs to achieve the goals of substantive, procedural
and efficient justice. This last proposal does not focus particularly on media-
tion, but we believe that it is essential to providing an experience of justice to
all seeking access to our court system.
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Mediation, and court-connected ADR more generally, were introduced as
coping mechanisms, to help overwhelmed courts make better use of their
existing resources in light of dramatically-expanded demands. A number of
speakers at the Pound Conference, however, also spoke of the need for legisla-
tors to appropriate more funds to permit the courts to expand, particularly the
number of judges and courtrooms available to citizens.16 Too many mediation
advocates have relied on "court bashing" to argue for the superiority of media-
tion. Mediation and other ADR processes, however, should not be imagined as
replacements for our courts or used as justifications for continued under-fund-
ing. A democratic nation's citizens should not be discouraged from accessing
their public courts or find that their access is rationed depending upon their
ability to withstand the financial and emotional costs of litigation (which now
includes ADR). Mediation and other ADR processes, rather than being viewed
as replacements, should complement a healthy judicial system.'
57
Moreover, if court-connected mediation is to help the courts provide sub-
stantive and procedural justice, courts require sufficient resources to ensure
high-quality adjunct programs. People believe in the substantive and procedu-
ral justice that can be found in the courts, including the adjunct processes
offered pursuant to court rules and statutes. This faith is important and some-
thing to be nurtured. The stakes are high: the very legitimacy of the nation's
courts.
A speaker at the Pound Conference eloquently foreshadowed many of the
proposals we have made here. Professor Earl Johnson suggested that the
investment being made in the nation's judiciary was too low. He was particu-
larly concerned that poor people or modest disputes might be shuffled to cut-
rate justice and observed that the benchmark for change should not be:
our system as presently structured and financed, but rather what it would cost to
provide a fully subsidized judicial system .... [Also,] we have to bear in mind that
we don't want to be 'supposedly' saving money, but merely casting things into even
more expensive forums that happen to be outside the judiciary, unless for some rea-
son these forums are doing a measurably better job than the courts for the cases
assigned to them .... [W]e have to pay a great deal of attention to the quality of
justice that's dispensed in the alternative institutions as well as the cost. I think we
may very well find that in some instances the price of low cost justice is simply too
high. 1
58
IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
The courts' experience in institutionalizing mediation should prove
instructive for policymakers considering the adoption of alternative processes
like those proposed by Professor Menkel-Meadow. Many lawyers served as
"process architects" for the development of a new paradigm of dispute resolu-
156 POUND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, at 112, 118.
157 See Nancy Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice
System, I CARDOZO ONLINE J. OF CONF. REsOL. 117, 141 (2004); Deborah R. Hensler, Our
Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our
Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 194-97 (2003).
158 POUND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, at 123-24. Other speakers also spoke to the dire
funding needs of the court system as a whole. Id. at 16, 112, 118.
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tion practice in the courts. The results? Significant success, but with serious
and sometimes worrisome limitations. Before leaping into the implementation
of new, alternative processes for "deliberative democracy," therefore, we urge
policy makers and process architects to answer the following questions.
A. What Are the Core Missions of the Institutions That Will Use These
Processes?
At times, the focus on institutions' shortcomings can blind us to what they
do well and the important societal roles they play. Participants in the Pound
Conference were attuned to the courts' mission of delivering substantive, pro-
cedural and efficient justice in an appropriate forum. The jurists, legal academ-
ics and bar leaders responsible for the subsequent implementation of court-
connected ADR programs, however, may not have taken seriously enough the
complexity of protecting that mission and ensuring that "justice" is always
done or at least sought.
It is true that today's legislatures are afflicted by bi-polar thinking and
limited input. But these legislatures also represent important, democratically-
elected forums for decision-making regarding difficult social issues. The goal
of any alternative, deliberative processes should be only and always to better
enable legislatures and agencies to achieve their unique missions within the
context of a democratic nation.
It is also true that the concept of thinking or acting like a lawyer can be
expanded to allow lawyers to serve as the architects of innovative processes.
The experience with court-connected mediation, however, demonstrates the
incredible difficulty of placing procedural justice, relationships and extra-legal
remedies on many lawyers' "philosophical map." Policy makers must plan for
these obstacles, not just wish them away.
B. What Specific Improvements Are to Be Achieved Through the
Institutionalization of New, Alternative Processes and Which of These
Are Most Important?
This article has argued that courts have had three goals in implementing
court-connected mediation: (1) substantive justice; (2) procedural justice; and
(3) efficient justice in appropriate forums. This article also identified several
objectives for each of these goals. Every goal is appealing; every objective is
worthwhile. But policy makers must be more selective, clarifying which goals
and objectives are most important and what they mean. Close analysis of the
Pound Conference proceedings, for example, strongly suggests that efficiency
was always meant as a secondary goal, serving the primary goals of substantive
and procedural justice. But many courts have established their court-connected
mediation programs based primarily on the goal of achieving greater efficien-
cies for the judicial system, apparently assuming that the goals of substantive
and procedural justice do not require attention.
Court-connected ADR has also been charged with meeting many objec-
tives, some of which conflict. For example, how can the courts ensure that all
mediated outcomes are consistent with the rule of law and represent the exer-
cise of parties' self-determination? What if these objectives clash? Which
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takes priority? Further, not all of the objectives for court-connected mediation
have been clearly defined. What does it mean, for example, that mediated out-
comes should respond to parties' needs? Which needs?
For policy makers considering the adoption of the deliberative processes
proposed by Professor Menkel-Meadow, the lessons are clear. Define your
goals and objectives clearly. Prioritize them. And to return to the point made
above in Section IV.A; do not forget the missions of the institutions that will
use these processes.
C. At What Points Could the Institutionalization of New, Alternative
Processes Actually Threaten an Institution's Ability to Fulfill its Core
Missions?
The experience of the courts, particularly the experiment with mandatory
mediation, suggests that if new processes supplant the old, they may indeed
threaten the ability of an institution to fulfill its core mission. The system of
checks and balances that characterizes our system of government 159 provides a
useful, pragmatic model to address this danger. For example, we have seen that
mandatory mediation can be used to ration people's access to merits-based
adjudication. If parties are able to opt out easily from mandatory mediation,
however, this level of individual discretion places an important check upon
some judges' tendency to order all parties into mediation regardless of its
appropriateness, as well as some mediators' tendency to behave in an overag-
gressive manner. In fact, the provision of this check upon judges' and
mediators' power almost necessarily means that court-connected mediation will
serve as a supplement or complement to the traditional operation of the courts.
Similarly, though new processes may nurture productive deliberation and
democracy, they also may be abused and used to limit citizens' access to public
decision-making. Citizens should therefore continue to be able to access and
use referenda and other traditional forms of political action.
D. How Can the Potential Improvements and Threats Be Measured, and
What Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms Will Be Put in Place to
Take These Measurements?
Besides clarifying and prioritizing objectives, it is essential to determine
how to measure their achievement. The entrepreneurs promoting innovations -
often true believers - sometimes find the need to transform their vision into
concrete, measurable results to be dull at best, and threatening at worst. Yet
early work to develop measurable outcomes will provide valuable information
regarding the successful implementation (or not) of a new paradigm for deliber-
ation and decision-making. In addition, putting together monitoring and evalu-
ation mechanisms early is much easier than developing such mechanisms after
a new program has developed its own vested constituencies (e.g., in the case of
court-connected mediation, paid mediators and judges relying on mediation to
clear dockets).
159 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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E. Who Will Be Responsible for Taking Responsive Action and How Can
Such Action Be Ensured?
In a way, this question brings us back to the first one. If an institution has
an important core mission, its ability to fulfill that mission must be protected.
If the institutionalization of new processes ever threatens the legitimacy of an
institution, accountable public actors must be ready to take responsive action.
CONCLUSION
We agree, as Professor Menkel-Meadow urges, that we may need "new
social, political and legal forms to deal with our modem problems of social
complexity."' 6° We suggest, however, that policy makers who consider Pro-
fessor Menkel-Meadow's innovative proposal proceed very deliberately, "in
the fashion of an artist creating a great mosaic."'' Though one complicated
section of the mosaic may require close attention, the artist also must step back
and judge whether the section fits with what has come before and what will be
added in the future. In other words, there must be faithfulness to an overarch-
ing vision.
At the Pound Conference, many participants cautioned that the implemen-
tation of alternatives to the judicial system could erode both important rights
guaranteed to all citizens and the processes that had evolved over centuries to
secure those rights. Thus, these participants worried that the alternatives might
provide neither appropriate and effective dispute resolution, nor "justice."
There are signs of danger in our analysis of the justice goals and objectives that
have and have not been achieved in court-connected mediation.
Professor Menkel-Meadow also writes that "[i]f process is to be the foun-
dational justification of democratic institutions, then lawyers have a great role
to play in the practice of democracy as both 'process architects' and as process
managers." 16 2 Yet the story of court-connected mediation reveals that judges
and lawyers find it very difficult to embrace "different orienting
frameworks" 163 and rarely recognize the importance of facilitating "true partic-
ipation" by parties. Overall, and probably for a variety of unsurprising rea-
sons, 164 lawyers have failed to make significant shifts in their roles despite the
160 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 352.
161 POUND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, at 278.
162 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 352.
163 Id. at 351.
"6 It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the reasons why attorneys may be resis-
tant to changes in their roles. But certainly, it is worth noting that any profession is likely to
cling to the unique abstract knowledge that serves as the basis for that profession's claim of
autonomy. The legal profession's unique abstract knowledge is contained in "the law" so it
should not be surprising that lawyers will favor a focus on legal norms or analysis over non-
legal alternatives. See Nancy Welsh, Institutionalization & Professionalization, in HAND-
BOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUrION (Bob Bordone & Michael Moffitt, eds.) (forthcoming 2005)
(describing elements that characterize professions). Further, lawyers tend to rely on rational
analysis in making decisions and have a need for control, dominance and leadership. See
Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attrib-
utes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. REV. 1337, 1352, 1420 (1997). Lawyers also
do not tend to listen to their clients or strategize with them (particularly individual, one-time
players), but instead cast the clients in the role of helpless individuals who require rescue
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nearly thirty years of experience with court-connected ADR that began with the
Pound Conference.
We end with these words from A. Leon Higginbotham at the Pound Con-
ference to remind us - and policy makers - of the "frame" for any proposed
changes to traditional democratic processes:
our goal cannot be merely a "reform" that seeks to ease the courts' caseloads. For
what does it profit us if, in making things easier for ourselves, we make things more
difficult for others? What does it profit us if, in shifting our burdens to other agen-
cies and institutions, we make impossible the burdens on those who must deal with
those agencies and institutions? What does it profit us if, in putting our own judicial
houses in order, we have no room in them for those who have relied and must con-
tinue to rely on the hospitality of the courts for the vindication of their rights? What
does it profit us if, by wielding a judicial and administrative scalpel, we cut our
workloads down to more manageable levels and leave the people without any forum
where they can secure justice?
165
Court-connected ADR and the alternative deliberative processes recom-
mended by Professor Menkel-Meadow have the potential to enhance the
engagement of citizens in the life of a democratic nation. They also have the
potential to get in the way and, indeed, subvert the implementation of democ-
racy. These alternative processes are simply new and fascinating tools. Their
ultimate value will depend upon our care in choosing how and when to use
them.
through benign intervention. See Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault's Approach to Power: Its
Allure and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REv. 395, 456 (2004). Once
again, it should not be surprising that in most court-connected non-family civil mediation,
lawyers have come to dominate the process and prefer evaluative interventions by mediators.
Last, lawyers do not tend to be creative, and neither legal education nor the importance of
rules, precedent and adversarial posturing in legal practice are likely to encourage break-
through thinking. See Janet Weinstein & Linda Morton, Stuck in a Rut: The Role of Creative
Thinking in Problem Solving and Legal Education, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 835, 845 (2003);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third Party Neutral: Creativity
and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 788 (1999). Given the psycho-
logical profile and professional role of lawyers, why should it be surprising that mediation
sessions involving lawyers generally produce the same monetary settlements generated by
traditional negotiation sessions and trial?
165 POUND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, at 91.
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